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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is designed to promote socially desirable goals, 5 ' and a joint attempt
at criminality obviously is not desirable behavior; to hold conversa-
tions furthering criminal conspiracy privileged because the conspir-
ators happen to be married would "require a finding that. . . the
commission of a crime would protect and strengthen the marital
bond."151
The marital privilege seems important in fostering communica-
tion between partners in viable marriages. Nonetheless, the judi-
ciary should guard against attempts on the part of wrongdoers to
shield themselves from prosecution by exploiting the privilege.
Hopefully, the joint criminality exception fashioned in Watkins will
help preclude misuse of the privilege without advancing its com-
plete abolition.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Court of Appeals establishes standards for production of
confidential informants.
In an attempt to safeguard the rights of criminal defendants
without unduly impairing the state's prosecutorial function, New
York courts have been developing rules concerning disclosure and
production of confidential police informers. 5 ' In People v.
Goggins, ' the New York Court of Appeals held that once it is estab-
675 (1929). Critics of the privilege maintain that the loss of evidence occasioned by its
application is unjustifiable in view of the uncertainty of any beneficial effect. See id. at 686.
One student commentator has urged that rising divorce rates and declining social emphasis
upon family integrity demonstrate that the effort to preserve harmony between spouses has
been futile. Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern
World, 7 CUNi. L. REV. 307, 321 (1976).
110 See, e.g., W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE §§ 410, 428, 447 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
People v. Watkins, N.Y.L.J., April 8, 1977, at 15, col. 2.
, Under the "informer's privilege," the identity of persons who impart information to
law enforcement officials is protected against disclosure. See Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 59 (1957); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 456 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). In Roviaro, the
United States Supreme Court recognized the value of informers to law enforcement organiza-
tions:
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest
in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement
officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that
obligation.
353 U.S. at 59. This privilege is particularly important in narcotics violation cases. See, e.g.,
People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 176, 313 N.E.2d 41, 48, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 581 (1974) (Jasen,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974). Nonetheless, it has been indicated that
the informer's privilege should not outweigh the defendant's right to confrontation where guilt
or innocence is at stake. See 34 N.Y. at 173, 313 N.E.2d at 46-47, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
1- 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
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lished that an informant's testimony clearly is relevant to a defen-
dant's guilt or innocence, the informer's identity must be dis-
closed. ' By way of dictum, the Court observed that in certain cir-
cumstances actual production of an informant might be necessary
to satisfy the underlying purpose of disclosure, which is to make the
informant available to the defense. 5 ' The situations in which pro-
duction would be warranted were not identified by the Court in
Goggins. Recently, however, in People v. Jenkins, 5 the Court of
Appeals amplified its prior decision by holding that when the
Goggins relevance requirement for disclosure has been satisfied, the
State may have a duty to produce an informant once under its
control even though the informant's unavailability is not due to bad
faith on the part of the State and despite the State's diligent efforts
to locate the informer.1 7 Such a duty arises, however, only if the
defendant demonstrates that the testimony of the informant would
either tend to exculpate the defendant, or cast a reasonable doubt
"1' 34 N.Y.2d at 170, 313 N.E.2d at 45, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 576. In Goggins, an informer
introduced the police to a narcotics seller. After the informer left the scene, a purchase was
made by an undercover officer. Defendant seller was arrested soon after by other officers
informed of the transaction by the undercover operative. At trial, defendant challenged the
reliability of the undercover officer's identification, demanding that disclosure of the in-
former's identity be ordered to resolve the issue. The Goggins Court held that where the issue
is one of guilt or innocence, the decision whether to disclose may be rendered only after a
full adversarial proceeding conducted either before or during the trial. In this proceeding, the
defendant must establish a foundation for his disclosure demand, the crucial element of
which is the relevance of the informer's testimony to defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. The
test was found to be satisfied in Goggins because the informant's testimony was relevant to
the issue of identification. Defendant was arrested at dusk in a public bar by a back-up team
of undercover police furnished with only a sketchy description of him by the undercover
officer who had transacted the sale. Additionally, a great deal of time had elapsed between
the sale of the narcotics and the identification of defendant by the purchasing officer. Id. at
172, 313 N.E.2d at 46, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78.
The Goggins test of relevance to guilt or innocence is similar to the balancing approach
utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62
(1957). Roviaro endeavored to strike a balance between the public interest in encouraging
informers to come forward and "the individual's right to prepare his defense." Id. Unfortun-
ately, the Roviaro Court offered no guidance with respect to procedural matters. See Note,
Disclosure of an Informant's Identity-The Substantive and Procedural Balance Tests, 39
ALB. L. REv. 561, 563 (1975). Consequently, New York courts began to formulate differing
procedural techniques. Compare People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 694, 262
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965), with People v. Delgado, 40 App. Div. 2d 554, 334 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't
1972) (mem.). Goggins resolved the conflict by establishing procedures that govern the dispo-
sition of different categories of informant disclosure situations.
' 34 N.Y.2d at 173, 313 N.E.2d at 46, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
41 N.Y.2d 307, 360 N.E.2d 1288, 392 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1977), afl'g 49 App. Div. 2d 683,
370 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th Dep't 1975) (mem.), and rev'g People v. Law, 48 App. Div. 2d 228,
368 N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dep't 1975).
'1' 41 N.Y.2d 306-07, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89.
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on the reliability of the prosecutor's case.' 8
In Jenkins, defendants were charged with selling heroin to an
undercover agent.' 9 After a private conversation with Pat Adams,
a police informant, they were introduced by Adams to an under-
cover agent. The defendants subsequently made a sale to the agent
which was witnessed by the informant.'60 Although her identity was
revealed by cross-examination of a prosecution witness,'"' Adams
was unavailable for the trial. Out of fear for her own safety, she had
moved to Florida with the assistance of the police and had subse-
quently disappeared.' 2 The prosecution had undertaken efforts to
locate the informer, but the search was fruitless.' 3 At trial, it was
defendants' position that they had not made the sale to the under-
cover agent. Since the informant was the only witness who would
be able to establish this, defendants argued, her testimony was
necessary to their defense.'64 Nevertheless, defendants' motion for
production of the witness was denied by the trial judge and convic-
tion followed.' ' The convictions were affirmed by the appellate divi-
sion. '
In upholding the convictions, the Court of Appeals expanded
upon its prior holding in Goggins. Judge Gabrielli, who authored the
majority opinion, noted that the essential purpose of the disclosure
rule was to make an informer possessing material information avail-
' Id. at 310-11, 360 N.E.2d at 1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
, ' Jenkins involved three defendants, Jenkins, Daniel, and Law, whose cases were con-
solidated on appeal. There were two separate trials, as Jenkins and Daniel were tried together.
All the appeals involved the same issue, that of the production of the informer, Pat Adams,
who had introduced each defendant to the same undercover agent.
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 314-18, 360 N.E.2d at 1292-94, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 591-94 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 309, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
62 The informer was provided with a hotel room, as she felt unsafe in her apartment.
Id. at 310 n.1, 360 N.E.2d at 1290 n.1, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 589 n.1. Still feeling insecure in the
hotel, she requested and received a plane ticket to Florida, paid for by the Federal Drug
Enforcement Administration. See People v. Law, 48 App. Div. 2d 288, 291, 368 N.Y.S.2d 627,
631 (4th Dep't 1975).
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 310, 360 N.E.2d at 1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89.
1'3 Id. at 314-15, 360 N.E.2d at 1292-93, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 591-92 (Fuchsberg, J., dissent-
ing).
,, Id. at 309, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
" Defendant Law's conviction was affirmed in People v. Law, 48 App. Div. 2d 228, 368
N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dep't 1975), with the court holding that production would not be appropri-
ate because the defendant made no showing of necessity for the informer's testimony. Id. at
234, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 634. Defendants Jenkins' and Daniel's convictions were affirmed in
People v. Jenkins, 49 App. Div. 2d 683, 370 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th Dep't 1975) (mem.), on the
ground that the exact issue had been decided in People v. Law, wherein it was held "under
identical circumstances that the production of the informant was not required." Id.
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able to the defendant for examination.' Ordinarily, disclosure of
the informer's identity would accomplish this objective. The Court
found, however, that where an informer who was under the control
of law enforcement authorities disappears, more than mere disclo-
sure is required; the duty to disclose in such a situation includes a
diligent effort on the part of the prosecution to produce the wit-
ness."' Turning to the question of when production might be com-
pelled if these diligent efforts fail, the Jenkins Court noted that,
absent bad faith on the part of the prosecution in either deliberately
concealing an informant or failing to make a diligent effort to pro-
duce him, "the right to production does not flow from the right to
disclosure."' 6 Reasoning that the prosecution should not be penal-
ized because of the voluntary disappearance of the informer, the
Court held defendants to a burden greater than the Goggins relev-
ance test to obtain production.'70 The Jenkins standard for produc-
tion requires a defendant to show that the proposed testimony either
would be exculpatory in nature or would raise a reasonable doubt
concerning the validity of the prosecution's case.'7' In the instant
case, Judge Gabrielli found that although the Goggins test was sat-
isfied, the extra burden was not carried by defendants since there
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 309, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588. This concept is grounded
in the sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses, which formed the basis of the
Goggins Court rationale. See 34 N.Y.2d at 168, 313 N.E.2d at 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
1" 41 N.Y.2d at 309, 360 N.E.2d at 1289, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
NI Id. (citations omitted). Jurisdictions that have considered the availability of the right
to production seem to agree that it is not necessarily coextensive with the right of disclosure.
See, e.g., United States v. Super, 492 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974);
United States v. Truesdale, 400 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1968); White v. United States, 330 F.2d
811 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964).
'7' 41 N.Y.2d at 312, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
' Id. at 310-11, 360 N.E.2d at 1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The Jenkins Court utilized a
standard similar to that developed in a line of Supreme Court cases. In Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the
prosecutor suppressed a companion's pretrial statements which were favorable to the ac-
cused. The Court found that this type of prosecutorial misconduct deprives a defendant of
due process "where the [suppressed] evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment"
regardless of the absence of bad faith. Id. at 87. The holding was refined in a recent Supreme
Court decision, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Agurs dealt with nontestimonial
exculpatory evidence withheld by the prosecution-specifically, a murder victim's prior con-
victions. Reasoning that reversal should not be required whenever such an error cannot be
categorized as harmless, the Agurs Court adopted a standard whereby an error is deemed
reversible only if the omitted evidence would have created a reasonable doubt in the context
of the entire case. Id. at 112. This standard bears a resemblance to the one articulated by
the Jenkins majority. Although the latter deals with an informer's potential testimony, and
the former with nontestimonial evidence, both concern a defendant's access to potentially
crucial material. Thus, the Jenkins requirement that potential testimony have doubt-creating
tendencies in order to warrant reversal appears to have precedential support.
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was insufficient proof of any exculpatory or doubt-creating quality
of the proposed testimony.1 2
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Fuchsberg contended that since
the informer was the only person able to corroborate any of the
testimony in the case, her testimony was vital and therefore satis-
fied the "higher standard of materiality and relevance" enunciated
by the majority. 7 ' Positing that the majority would require defen-
dants to demonstrate that the testimony would be favorable to the
defense in order to obtain production of the information, the dissent
stated that this would "be but to mock" fundamental rights as
articulated in Goggins. "I Furthermore, Judge Fuchsberg believed
that the conduct of the prosecutor in allowing Adams to leave the
state, especially in light of a prosecutor's knowledge of the habits
of informers, was the equivalent of bad faith.'75
At first blush, the holding of the Jenkins Court appears consis-
tent with the stated purpose of Goggins-to make an informer pos-
sessing relevant information available to the defendant. Production
is a device utilized to ensure the effectiveness of disclosing an in-
former's identity. In instances where the informer is unavailable due
to the prosecutor's bad faith, production is quite properly ordered;
otherwise the defendant is as effectively denied access to the in-
former as if disclosure never occured.'75 Where the informer is un-
available through no fault of the prosecutor, however, it would be
172 41 N.Y.2d at 311-12, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
t Id. at 315, 360 N.E.2d at 1293, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 316, 360 N.E.2d at 1294, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judge
Fuchsberg emphasized that the informant had never been available to the defendants, ren-
dering it virtually impossible to prove that her testimony would be favorable. Id.
"I Id. at 317-18, 360 N.E.2d at 1294, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
According to the Jenkins majority, if the prosecutor acts in bad faith in failing to secure the
informer's presence, production would be mandated. Judge Fuchsberg believed that Adams'
disappearance, effectuated with official cooperation, was equivalent to bad faith. The major-
ity disagreed, basing its opinion upon the premise that the prosecution acted in good faith.
See id. at 310, 360 N.E.2d at 589, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 1290.
'7, Other courts considering this problem generally have adopted the view that in certain
instances the State must either produce an informant or suffer dismissal. See, e.g., Hernan-
dez v. Nelson, 298 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afd, 411 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1969) (where
prosecutor deliberately allowed an informer who was a material witness to disappear, produc-
tion or dismissal is mandated); People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 2d 748, 349 P.2d 673, 3 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1960) (where authorities purposely postponed arrest to allow informer to escape, a fair trial
was denied the defendant). See also People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1973) (due to deliberate failure to obtain informer's full name, prosecutor ordered
to provide information sufficient to make informer available to defendant); Eleazer v. Supe-
rior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 464 P.2d 42, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1970) (prosecutor must provide
information adequate to enable defendant to locate informer and must engage in good faith
search).
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unfair to place an absolute duty of production upon the state with-
out requiring proof of some additional need for the testimony.
Upon closer analysis, however, it appears that the Jenkins stan-
dard may effectively eliminate a defendant's right to force produc-
tion in the absence of bad faith on the part of the State. While the
majority opinion necessitates only a showing that an informer's tes-
timony is likely to be favorable, '77 this standard is not susceptible
to neat and precise applicalion. If, as Judge Fuchsberg contended,
the application of this principle in Jenkins indicates that a defen-
dant must show a missing informant's testimony to be favorable to
the defense, production would seem unavailable to many defen-
dants. Indeed, those having the greatest need for an informant's
testimony, defendants who claim that the informant is the only
person in a position to refute the facts presented by the prosecution,
would face an almost insurmountable barrier to production. In the
event that the Jenkins rule is applied this strictly, a defendant
establishing bad faith or lack of diligence on the part of the State
would have the greatest likelihood of obtaining production. Con-
versely, should the standard be applied in a less-demanding man-
ner, it may become feasible to demonstrate a significant probability
of exculpatory or doubt-creating tendencies in an informant's testi-
mony and thereby force production. '78 Notwithstanding this uncer-
tainty regarding the proper application of the Jenkins rule, it is
hoped that New York prosecutors, now on notice of disclosure and
production standards, will exercise a high degree of care in the han-
dling of informers.
INSURANCE LAW
Ins. Law § 671(4): Physical therapy expenses and chiropractic fees
includable in calculating no-fault's "serious injury" threshold.
Section 671(4)(b) of New York's no-fault insurance law allows
a "covered person" to maintain an action against another covered
person for "noneconomic loss" if the former has incurred reasonable
and necessary medical expenses in excess of $500.'19 The legislature
'" 41 N.Y.2d at 311, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
179 It is possible that in Jenkins, the prosecutor's case was of such strength that the
standard applied by the majority could not be met. There also appeared to be other evidence
that undercut the defendants' contention. See 41 N.Y.2d at 312, 360 N.E.2d at 1291, 392
N.Y.S.2d at 592. Perhaps if presented with a weaker prosecution case, this burden could have
been carried, for then the informant's testimony would have weighed more heavily upon the
outcome of the case.
"I N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). N.Y. INs. LAw § 671(4)(b)
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